TESTIMONY OF SAM RAY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
U.S. SENATE
MARCH 22,2000
REGARDING HISTORICAL WORKING CONDITIONS
AT THE PORTSMOUTH, OHIO DIFFUSION PLANT AND REMEDIES NEEDED TO ADDRESS THE
HEALTH OF DOE NUCLEAR WORKERS
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I am Sam Ray, a former uranium enrichment worker at the Portsmouth Gaseous
Diffusion Plant in Portsmouth, Ohio. I reside at 128 Overlook Drive,
Lucasville, OH.
I was hired in 1954 and worked as a production operator and instrument
mechanic. In May of 1994, 1 was diagnosed with a rare type of bone cancer:
chondrosarcoma. As a result, I had to have my larynx removed. At that point,
I had no option but to take a disability retirement. My understanding is that
there are two things that can cause my type of cancer. One is Paget's
Disease, which I didn't have, and the other is radiation exposure, which I
did have. I have never smoked a day in my life. It is well documented that
certain uranium compounds are bone seekers.
Your Committee's hearing is especially timely. The Administration has
proposed legislation to compensate workers nationwide from beryllium, and a
remedy for radiation-related cancers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
in Paducah, Kentucky. However, uranium enrichment workers exposed to
radiation at Portsmouth and Oak Ridge were left out of the Administration's
bill. We hope you will make sure Portsmouth and Oak Ridge workers are not
left out of the final legislation. I believe my testimony illustrates how we
toiled under conditions no less hazardous than Paducah.
1. PORTSMOUTH FAILED TO PROVIDE WORKERS WITH ADEQUATE
PROTECTION FROM RADIATION, HEAVY METALS & TOXIC CHEMICALS
In prosecuting the Nation's cold war mission, workers at Portsmouth were
kept in the dark about the hazards they faced. Information was provided based
on a "need to know" basis--and production imperatives determined what you
needed to know. Even to this day, we don't know what we confronted. For
example, when we started feeding irradiated recycled uranium back into the
process system, we never knew we were introducing contaminants (e.g.,
technetium, plutonium, neptunium, etc.), nor were we adequately protected.
Today we are still leaming about the extent to which transuranic elements,
such as plutonium, were part of the working environment.
A. THE PORTSMOUTH OXIDE CONVERSION PLANT (705-E) CAUSED NUMEROUS INTERNAL
RADIATION DOSES
Portsmouth operated a facility that converted highly enriched uranium (HEU)
oxides into feed material from 1961-1978. Much of this HEU oxide (87%
enriched) was shipped in from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and
processed in the 705-E building.
A good friend of mine, Robert Elkins, worked in the oxide plant from
1962-65. By 1965 he was placed on permanent work restriction due to high
internal body counts of radiation. He had enriched uranium, technetium-99,
neptunium-237, potassium and cesium in his body. When he retired in 1985 he
was still on permanent restriction, a situation that confronted many other
oxide plant workers. In the 15 years since retirement, the plant management
has never contacted him to check on his health or suggest that he receive
post-retirement monitoring.
However, Mr. Elkins was contacted by an individual from Hanford, WA
(presumably the transuranium registry) who wanted to pay him $500 for his
body so the government could study what happened to the radiation in his body
after he passed away. He wife was also offered $500.
They both declined the offer. It appears that the government is more
interested in what happens to Mr. Elkins after he is dead than what happens
to him while he is still alive. If the Congress is funding this kind of
effort, perhaps it could reorient the Department of Energy's priorities
toward caring for the living.
Mr. Elkins' over exposures to radiation were not the exception, it appears.
A 1985 DOE report states(1):"the oxide conversion facility was not able to
maintain adequate containment of the radioactive materials during operating
periods."
"As such, the decision was made in the 1977 time frame to shut down that
facility pending modifications to provide adequate containment measures.
These modifications were never funded, and the facility has not operated
since."
In vivo body counts (a relatively insensitive method of measuring the
amounts of radiation in the lung) taken after 1965 found eight employees with
radiation counts above DOE's 15 rem lung standard and two employees had more
than 7.5 rem (half of DOE's standard). Since 1972, another 7 were found with
more than 7.5 rem(2). Of the 17 employees listed above, 11 had worked in the
oxide conversion facility. This number of overexposed workers actually
measured and reported by Goodyear Atomic underscores the point that workers
in the oxide conversion facility were subjected to uptakes of excessive
levels of radiation.
B.NEUTRON DOSES WERE NOT MEASURED BETWEEN 1954 AND 1992
The Portsmouth plant's radiation dosimetry programs have been woefully
inadequate. For example, NIOSH discovered that between 1954 and 1992 the site
never measured for neutron exposures. Worker dose records, consequently, do
not exist for neutrons. "Slow cooker" effects from the concentration of
uranium deposits in the cascade causes neutron emissions. Workers called in
to clean out "freeze ups" of uranium inside of the cascade would be
particularly at risk from neutrons, but there are no recorded doses to
document these exposures.
C. WORKERS INGESTED TECHNETIUM-99-A BETA EMITTER
Technetium-99, a fission product, was introduced into the cascades from
recycled uranium reactor tails, most which had been first processed at
Paducah. Worker urine dose records from CY 1976, 1977 and 1978 indicate that
27% of the chemical operators at Portsmouth tested positive for technetium-99
(66% tested positive for uranium)(3). In vivo lung monitoring established
that 2 of the 45 maintenance mechanics had positive confirmed doses of
technetium-99 to the lungs. Curiously, 563 mechanics were tested for uranium
over a three year period, but only 45 were tested for technetium-99 or
neptunium-237. Depending on whether the Tc-99 was in a vapor or solid form,
special personal protective equipment (such as supplied air respirators) was
required, but not provided until the early 1980s. One pregnant worker had a
calculated dose 800 millirem to the fetal thyroid(4) of her 10- 11 week old
fetus, providing further evidence of inadequate worker protection. Amazingly,
between 1954 and 1993, the site had no technical basis document for rad
protection, which would have included the protocols for conducting a
monitoring program for transuranics.
D. CONTAMINATION CONTROLS WERE NON EXISTENT OR WOEFULLY
INADEQUATE UNTIL THE 1990S
When I was hired in 1954, process operators were not allowed to wear
coveralls or safety shoes. If clothing became contaminated, we took this
contamination home with us on our clothing and shoes. To my knowledge, all
crafts (such as electricians, maintenance mechanics, etc) were allowed to
wear coveralls and safety shoes. Some were mandatory. Sometime in the 60's,
coveralls became optional for process operators; however, it wasn't until the
90's when contamination controls were implemented that they became mandatory.
In reality, they should have always been mandatory.
E. DOSE RECORDS HAVE BEEN 'ZEROED' OUT OVER LIABILITY CONCERNS
As others will testify today, management directed that a guard's radiation
dose records be "zeroed" out after he had an uptake and was hospitalized,
because of the concern that he would bring a worker comp claim. We have no
idea if this was an isolated case or a regular management practice.
F. RADIATION DOSES WERE ARBITRARILY "ASSIGNED" (INSTEAD OF BEING COUNTED)
OSHA was called into Portsmouth after complaints filed by the Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) and the Guards union questioned the accuracy of
radiation doses. Management directed that doses be administratively
"assigned" when the health physics staff had trouble reading dose badges. One
practice involved pinning a dose badge to the wall and running a scanner over
it and assigning this dose to any person whose dose badge didn't read out on
a scanner. A settlement of this OSHA complaint resulted in a reconstruction
of doses between 1993-1995. While management was generally conservative in
assigning doses, at least 103 doses were undercounted. We have no idea how
far back management was simply administratively "assigning" doses, instead of
counting them.
Historically, the Health Physics program did little to investigate high
radiation doses, based on the philosophy that high doses were unlikely.
Whenever high dose readings were found on badges, they were determined to be
equipment failures and summarily discarded. DOE has historically claimed no
responsibility for the deficient health physics program and poor record
keeping.
G. CHEMICAL OPERATORS WERE OVEREXPOSED TO MERCURY AND ARSENIC
Between 1981 and 1990, decontamination workers in the X-705 (decontamination
process) building were exposed to mercury at up to 175 times the OSHA
threshold limit values, largely from open vats of solvents. A 1990 DOE
investigation found "workers were exposed at least once per shift, after
sodium hydroxide was added tanks" and that Martin Marietta's plant doctor
trivialized the hazards of ingesting mercury in discussions with affected
employees.(5)
Arsenic contaminated feed was fed into the Portsmouth cascades in the late
1980's. Arsenic migrated towards copper instrument lines causing them to plug
up. In 1993 after the presence of inorganic arsenic was confirmed, NIOSH
conducted a health hazard evaluation. Air samples detected arsenic in excess
of OSHA limits.
H. RESPIRATORY PROTECTION DEPENDED ON V~MI-ERA GAS MASKS FOR MANY YEARS AND
CONTAMINATION WAS WIDESPREAD
I worked at the Extended Range Product (ERP) station on and off for a number
of years. On one occasion while connecting the production process into an
empty cylinder, the copper tubing pigtail ruptured. Although I immediately
valved off the system, the room was filled with a thick fog of uranium oxide
gases. I donned an army assault mask for protection. After the all clear
signal, management sent me to the hospital for urinalysis. Today, we know
that you should wait for 3-4 hours to give the material time to get into your
system before urinalysis. For that reason, my dose records from this accident
is going to be suspect, at best.
Indeed, until the mid 1970's, our respirator protection consisted of World
War II army assault masks. It was years later that we learned that these were
not adequate to block radionuclides or toxic chemicals.
In the late 50's and early 60's we had big layoffs. Prior to this layoff,
the lab took samples to make sure process gases were reduced to a safe level
before opening up the process equipment for maintenance work. In the process
buildings, operators had to take over the work of lab technicians.
Previously, the lab techs used bulb samples that would be taken to the lab
and analyzed. The new system consisted of pulling a sample through a tube of
salicylic acid (white powder). If the powder didn't change color in three (3)
minutes, then it was assumed the system was <1 0 ppm UF6 (commonly called a
"negative").
We now know this was never an approved method, and there wasn't adequate
research. In turn, we put maintenance crafts and others in harm's way when we
issued a hazardous work permit stating that system was at a "negative".
L WORKERS WERE KEPT IN THE DARK ON CONTAMINATION CONTROLS
Early on, we were told that the buildings would be so clean, we could eat
off the floors. In reality, some eating areas became so contaminated that
management had to build designated lunch rooms that were surveyed on a
regular basis and kept clear (1980's).
Due the lack of a contamination control program, certain buildings were
becoming more contaminated. For example, leaks from the ERP station had
spread contamination in the X-326 building. Compressors would malfunction and
process gases (UF6) would leak to the atmosphere. On ONE occasion, it was so
bad that it looked like a fog moving up the building, which is approximately
V2 mile long. I became personally aware of this contamination problem when
working as an instrument mechanic, because we had to work in areas that we
knew or suspected were contaminated. I often felt we should have surveys, but
at the time it was a hassle to get your supervisor to request a survey.
Today, the story is different.
We have had many small releases which were never reported, as well as
documented large releases. In side of the withdrawal room we a major release.
There were green "icicles" hanging in the room from crystalized uranium
hexaflouride. Management had declined to install safety measures to prevent
this release.
Goodyear Atomic issued a Health Physics Philosophy as a Guide for
Housekeeping Problems in the Process Areas, which it distributed to all
supervisors on August 27, 1962. While management assured workers there was no
hazard at the uranium enrichment facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, it warned
supervisors:
"We don't expect or desire that the philosophy will be openly discussed with
bargaining unit employees. Calculations of contamination indices should be
handled by the General Foreman and kept as supervisional information in
deciding the need for decontamination."
Until the 1980's, there were few or no personal radiation monitors (frisking
devices). This technology was available, but apparently for DOE the cost
outweighed the risk. In the 90's, this all changed. Today, in certain
buildings and areas, you have to monitor clothing and shoes whenever you
leave the building to make sure you aren't tracking radiation into clean
areas or off plant site. Primarily, the problem lies in the first 35 years.
What were the former workers exposed unknowingly or perhaps even knowingly?
We know that they are having many health problems, such as cancers and
respiratory problems, and in numbers far greater than would be expected.
2. INSPECTIONS WERE INFREQUENT UNDER DOE'S SELF REGULATION
A July 1980 Comptroller General report, Department of Energy's Safety and
Health Program for Enrichment Plant Workers Is Not Adequately Implemented
(EMD-80-78), found that DOE's Oak Ridge Office, which had oversight
responsibility for health and safety, had not conducted a safety inspection
at Portsmouth for 3 years and was not adequately responding to worker safety
complaints. Unannounced safety inspections were supposed to occur annually at
each plant, but even when they were inspected, the Oak Ridge Office "does
not, as part of an inspection or any other visit to an enrichment plant,
monitor for radiological contamination." Oak Ridge explained the absence of
inspections on a staff shortage, which the Comptroller General noted was
attributable to Oak Ridge paying safety inspectors at a lower grade than
elsewhere in the DOE complex.
3. HEALTH EFFECTS ARE ON THE MINDS OF MANY CURRENT AND FORMER WORKERS
Currently, I am a retiree representative for the Worker Health Protection
Program (WHPP). This program is funded by a grant authorized under Section
3162 of the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act, and administered by Queens
College and the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers Union
("PACE"). It gives former workers a one-time complete. When I talk to former
workers and retirees, I find out how little they knew about what they were
exposed to. I get calls from widows whose husbands have passed away with
cancers. They want to know if their spouse's exposure in the workplace caused
their illness.
In 1987 NIOSH reported that Portsmouth workers had experienced excess
stomach cancer and hematopoietic cancers (including leukemia). In 1992 the
study was updated, in part, due to a request from Senator John Glenn. In
1996, the study summary was presented to the workforce. It indicated that
there were no statistically significant elevations of any cancer deaths and
the elevations of stomach and hematopoietic cancers identified in the 1987
study had diminished. These results were presented to the media in September
1999(6) . However, the NIOSH officials releasing this information apparently
chose to DELETE the page defining the study's limitations(7), which includes
(*1) this was a mortality study and not a study of disease incidence; (*2)
the population is still relatively young to conduct an epidemiology study;
(*3) case control studies would be better at identifying cause and effect;
(*4) the exposure data is weak; and (*5) workers were exposed to a mix of
chemicals and radiation and the effects are difficult o disentangle. We
obtained the deleted text. These limitations, if incorporated, substantially
alter the light in which the findings should be considered. What motivated
this apparent censorship is beyond our knowledge.
4. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR CONGRESS
Congressman Ted Strickland and 10 cosponsors introduced HR 3495 to provide
workers' compensation for radiation exposed workers at DOE nuclear facilities
and suppliers. It lays down important marker, because, unlike the
Administration's bill (HR 3418 and S 1954), it expands coverage beyond the
Paducah workforce and 55 workers in Oak Ridge to cover the entire DOE nuclear
complex.
Any successful bill must shift the burden of proof to the government in
determining causation, because the failure to properly monitor for radiation
and toxic hazards imposes an insurmountable burden of proof on a victim. Dose
reconstruction is very costly, takes years to accomplish and the results are
questionable at best since basic data was never collected in many cases.
NIOSH noted in a 1993 report, that "prior to 198 1, the amount of
quantitative industrial hygiene data is scant to non existent.(8)"
A single agency, such as the Labor Department's Office of Worker
Compensation Programs, should administer a federal workers comp program. We
need one stop shopping for addressing occupational illnesses regardless of
whether it is beryllium, radiation, toxic chemicals or heavy metals.
The current medical screening program carried out by DOE under Section 3162
of the FY 93 Defense Authorization Act should go even further, with lifetime
annual medical screening. We need fully paid medical insurance for displaced
or retired workers. A Medigap supplement should be fully funded by the
government for nuclear workers.
Workers at Portsmouth and Paducah face a unique problem with retiree health
care benefits. Since USEC was privatized, it assumed responsibility for the
Lockheed Martin retiree health care benefits program. However, these benefits
could be in jeopardy if USEC, as many predict, will fall into bankruptcy or
liquidate in several years. Unlike pensions, retiree health care benefits are
not guaranteed under ERISA. We need legislation to guarantee that the finds
which the DOE will be giving to USEC to cover the past retire health care
liability are placed in a safe harbor and these health benefits will be
delivered as intended.
SUMMARY
Energy Secretary Richardson acknowledged that "After decades of denial, the
government is conceding that workers who helped make nuclear weapons were
exposed to radiation and chemicals that produced cancer and early death."' In
the New York Times article, the Secretary said: "In the past, the role of
government was to take a hike,....and I think that was wrong. " Nuclear
workers have paid a price and deserve a fair remedy.
Works Cited
1) The Report of the Joint Task Force on Uranium Recycle Materials
Processing,
of Energy, 1985, DOE/OR-859
2) Information on Three Ohio Defense Facilities, Fact Sheet for the Ranking
Minority Members, Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and
Government Processes, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate,
November 1985, GAO/RCED-86-5 11 FS.
3) Response to Freedom of Information Act Request by OCAW to the DOE, July
1, 1982.
4) A July 22, 1976 letter from Karl Hubner, Oak Ridge Associated
Universities to EN. Hansen, Goodyear Atomic, states: "The dose of .8 to 1.0
rad to the thyroid gland of a fetus is considered to be insignificant, and
there is no reasonable chance of damage to this organ in terms of cretinism."
The letter qualified this conclusion by stating: "calculations were based on
some gross assumptions that had to be made because of insufficient data."
5) Letter from Gene Gillespie, Site Manager, DOE to Ralph Donnelly, Plant
Manager, Martin Marietta, July 20, 1990, Letter EO-221-696.
6) Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Study Summary, Rinsky, Ahrenholz, and
Cardarelli, September 1999
7)Restated below are portions that were deleted by NIOSH before releasing
the summary:
"All observational epidemiologic studies have some limitations since they
take advantage of naturally occurring events rather than being conducted in
an experimentally controlled environment. Here are the biggest limitations
that we know about:
*1) This is still a very young population and the vast majority of them are
still alive. As the workforce grows older, deaths will occur at an increasing
rate and of course there is no way to know what these people will eventually
die from;
*2) this is a study of mortality, not disease incidence. Only diseases that
have high case fatality rate are measured well by mortality. Although most
cancers have a high case fatality rate, there has been great progress over
the past two decades in prolonging the life of persons with hernatopoeitic
cancers. Mortality may not be a good measure of these deaths;
*3) SMR analyses are not particularly good attributing the proper effects of
confounding and effect modification. The case control studies that are being
worked on are much better in this regard;
*4) the exposure response portion of these analyses are only as good as the
exposure metrics. Because of the way the plant collected exposure data our
algorithims for assigning exposure, while the best that can be done, still
have a degree of uncertainty To the extent that real exposures are over or
under estimated, our answers will be in error; and finally,
*5) these workers were simultaneously exposed to a number of chemical and
physical agents and it is very difficult to disentangle the effects of the
concurrent exposures.
Moreover, these workers are protected by some other factors associated with
their employment at this facility, such as lower alcohol and smoking rates as
a consequence of their security clearance requires. This further complicates
the interpretation of any harmful effects there might have been suffered."
8) Protocol for the Study of Mortality Patterns Among Uranium Conversion and
Enrichment Workers, NIOSH, J. Stebbins, etal, July I ~ 1993, pp. 15
9) New York Times, January 29, 2000, pp 1.