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By: J Truman
August 15, 1996
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For the first six months of this year it looked like 1996 would be the year when the four decade old quest for a Test-ban Treaty would be realized. In January France conducted its last planned nuclear test explosion in the South Pacific and announced it would join the international moratorium against testing and would sign a Test-ban. In the United States President Clinton in his State of the Union Address pledged U.S. support for a zero-yield Test-ban and heralded its upcoming completion later this year.
Even China, while still planning another round of test explosions, stated its willingness to sign a Test-ban and terminate its nuclear testing program once a final treaty was completed and ready to sign this fall. On the surface it appeared that there would be no road blocks to concluding a Test-ban by the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in September. Prospects for a total Test-ban had never looked better.
Universal optimism was still holding when the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD) met in Geneva in May to draft the final text of the Test-ban. It planned to have the Treaty text finalized and completed by June 28 so that it could be submitted to the General Assembly for signing in September. Governments and their foreign policy spokespersons were busy releasing statements on the steady progress toward the treaty's completion. With its labeling as a sure thing interest in the ongoing talks in Geneva quickly faded among the international media, and even among active opponents of testing.
From mid-May on Test-ban prospects took a marked turn for the worst. By the CD's self-imposed deadline on June 28 hopes of reaching a Test-ban at all were in serious doubt. First China took center stage as the number one problem when, after beginning its new test series, it announced it would not accept, or sign a Test-ban unless the treaty allowed for conducting so-called peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). (Such explosions utilize nuclear devices for civilian purposes such as excavation, oil and gas exploration and recovery, and damn and canal building.)
In support of its position China announced a massive civilian construction project to divert water from the mountains of Tibet to remote regions of the Taklimakan desert in northwestern China. The project called for the construction of a 500 mile underground canal from the Yarlung Tsangpo River to the Xinjiang region. Xinjiang coincidentally also happens to contain the Lop Nor test site used by China for all its military related testing. China claimed the plan would allow for the establishment of forests and provide food for millions. It also said the project would only be possible with the use of nuclear explosives.
China, which has yet to conduct any nuclear explosions dedicated only for PNE purposes wasn't about to stop with "The Great Canal". It also raised the issue that life on Earth could be wiped out by a comet or asteroid at any time, and that China must have PNE capability to be ready to defend the planet. After considerable international pressure and ridicule, China finally agreed on June 6 --two days after conducting another nuclear explosion -- that it would agree to drop its demand for PNEs to be excluded from a Test-ban.
No sooner had China compromised on the PNE issue and put the talks back in motion again than India raised concerns and opposition to the draft text that quickly and seriously deadlocked the talks. Expressing deep concerns over the treaty's lack of commitment from the five confirmed nuclear weapons states to set a timetable for total nuclear disarmament, and the ability of such nuclear powers as the United States to continue weapons development, India announced on June 20 that it would not sign the treaty. Standing firmly on its position and refusing to compromise India's actions forced the CD to miss its June 28 deadline. The delegates to the CD talks left for a month recess with the prospects for completing a Test-ban bleak at best.
The two weeks before the June 28 deadline saw several developments that both threatened and aided efforts to complete the Treaty. In the United States two actions were to have contradictory effects. First the White House announced it was canceling, at least temporarily, a sub-critical nuclear test planned for June 16 at the Nevada Test Site. The test would have been conducted underground at the U.S. testing site. It would have utilized high explosives and nuclear material, but was claimed to have no actual nuclear yield. It is because of the lack of any yield that the tests are called sub-critical. Yet, it was to take place 800 feet underground in a facility specially constructed to conduct nuclear explosions of extremely small yield. (See separate article on Sub-critical testing in this special report for more details) The test had raised the concerns of many of the delegates at the CD, and was being used as an example of how the "Big-5" nuclear weapons states, especially the United States, had no real desire to end weapons development.
At the same time U.S. Senators, Kyle(R)-Arizona and Reid(D)-Nevada, introduced an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill allowing the President to resume nuclear testing at the Nevada Test Site after September 30 if no Test-ban Treaty had been completed. This move was seen by many of the participants at the talks that U.S. support for a ban on testing was not that firm and was quickly becoming a rallying cry for both Treaty critics and a red flag of danger for hard core Treaty supporters. The amendment was defeated in the Senate after intervention by President Clinton. Both Senators plan similar actions when the U.S. Congress goes back into secession this Fall. (For more information see separate article in this report "Kyle-Reid and the GOP".
On June 28 Test-ban negotiating chairman Jaap Ramaker submitted to the CD delegates a draft of a complete Test-ban Treaty. The treaty would permanently ban all nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions of any kind, or of ANY yield. He urged the delegates to review the text during the July recess. Delegates tabled the text and adjourned, leaving the hope that diplomatic efforts and pressure during the month long break would forge a breakthrough
For more detailed information and a review of documents covering this period of the Test-ban talks please see "Selected Background Documents and Information"
From the start of the month long break in the CD talks the United States maintained a diplomatic campaign to secure acceptance of the Ramaker treaty text. President Clinton sent personal letters to the leaders of India and Pakistan. Ambassadors spoke with their counterparts. The efforts were targeted to not only India and Pakistan but toward China and Russia as well. Pakistan had stated it would oppose the treaty and would refuse to sign it if India did not sign. China still was expressing strong reservations over verification procedures proposed in the treaty and Russia was still not firmly on board. Britain likewise was not fully committed to the treaty and was still refusing to make any compromise on the Entry Into Force (EIF) provisions that were a key factor in India's opposition.
Throughout this period even with mounting international pressure, U.S. diplomatic intervention, and escalating condemnation in the international press, India remained unmovable. Without changes it would not sign the proposed treaty and it might even use its veto power to kill the treaty entirely. In late July the United States used the Southeast Asian Conference taking place in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta for its final diplomatic blitz before the CD talks resumed on July 29.
For a detailed review of India's opposition to the Test-ban Treaty and the reasons behind its position please see "INDIA, VILLAIN, HERO, OR SCAPEGOAT" in this special report.
The United States had hoped that the gathering of South Asian nations would be able to swing India into favoring the Treaty. While the efforts at the conference failed on that score they did produce an important and significant result. On July 24 representatives of the United States and Russia announced they had reached agreement and both nations would support the Ramaker text and vote for its acceptance. Both nations said they were supporting the Treaty text even though it was not perfect and fell short of what they wanted. They also called for making no more changes to it and asked for world acceptance and support for it in its present state. With the agreement between the U.S. and Russia both Britain and France quickly announced their support and the concern and diplomatic efforts once again focused on the two key hold outs, India and China.
It was China that took the international spotlight again in the final hours before the CD talks resumed. On July 28 only hours before the talks were to start China exploded a small yield nuclear device underground at its Lop Nor testing site. The test under 5 kilotons was followed by a wave of international protest, especially from other Asian and South Asian states. Even the United States issued a formal protest and called upon China to cease testing and join a Test-ban.
In the official Chinese government announcement of the test China made a surprising gesture by saying that the just completed nuclear test would be its LAST, and that as of Tuesday July 30 it was joining the international moratorium on testing, and that it would sign the Test-ban. While China's announcement of its LAST test and its full support for a Test-ban left both outrage and surprise in its wake. China was not through with its nuclear games.
No more had the talks got underway on July 29 than Sha Zukang, China's chief negotiator, told the delegates that China's test the day before was, "just to show that China is very positive toward the negotiations and that we want a treaty before September." He told them that "they should welcome the test since China's testing is over." Then Sha dropped a bomb of his own by stating that China had problems with the Ramaker treaty text and it wanted the negotiations reopened and the treaty changed. While sermonizing as to China's desire to see a Test-ban quickly finalized and signed, Sha made it clear that without its proposed changes China would not support the treaty.
Coupled with a reaffirmed "NO" from India, China's demand for changes and more negotiations cast a depressing chill over the resumption of the talks. If a Test-ban was to happen a compromise had to be quickly reached with both China and India. Time was running out.
The United States aggressively sought diplomatic solutions with the hold outs. The U.S. position was to offer assurances and promises over the concerns raised by China and India and to oppose any effort to reopen negotiations. They also felt that if China could be won over a joint effort by China and the U.S. would be able to bring Pakistan on board, leaving India isolated in the face of rising international scorn. China's concerns centered on verification procedures and with what was required to force on site inspections. China felt it was too easy under the proposed treaty for other powers to demand, and get on site visits to Chinese nuclear facilities and sites. It felt such easy requirements were a threat to its national sovereignty.
After high-level discussions the U.S. and China finally announced they had reached an agreement on the verification issue. On August 7 China announced it would now support the Ramaker text and would sign, leaving only the problem of India and Pakistan in the way to completion of the Test-ban. The problem of India was another matter entirely and was proving to be a much more difficult obstacle. Worse, time was now becoming critical. If agreement was not reached during the week of August 12 it was unlikely a final treaty could be completed in time to bring it to the United Nations in September. Worse yet was the possibility looming over the last frantic week that India might do more than refuse to sign the Test-ban. India might just exercise its veto power and kill it entirely.
The fateful week began with no resolution of the problem of India and Pakistan. India's opposition centers on three main points. It wants a firm assurance written into the treaty itself that commits the five admitted nuclear weapons states to set a timeline for total nuclear disarmament. Without such an assurance India maintains all other non-nuclear weapons states will be placed at an unfair security disadvantage. The "Big-5" of course have refused to even discuss getting rid of their nuclear weapons, outlawing sub-critical tests, or curbing weapons development by computer simulation. Secondly, India wants changes to the Treaty's Enter into Force provisions that require the treaty to be signed by the three supposed nuclear weapons states India, Pakistan, and Israel before it can go into force. Lastly, India claims that the Treaty by banning only actual testing of nuclear devices and not laboratory and computer simulation testing will allow the "Big 5", especially the United States, to continue weapons development, while preventing the less technologically advanced states such as India from similar activities.
Sadly, only India's very basic concerns over disarmament and limited discussions of the EIF issue have taken place in the world's press. The complexity and strongly held concerns behind India's position are poorly understood at best, if at all. At home India's position is viewed as a vital national security issue and enjoys widespread support across India, and across the many and varied Indian political parties. Because of this it is doubtful if any Indian government could , or would go against these sentiments and drop its opposition. Likewise it is doubtful that without a much better understanding of the issues behind India's opposition can any diplomatic efforts force a change in India's position. Yet one thing is certain. The future on a Test-ban Treaty right now hangs on what India decides to do, or not do.
What would India decide to do this week? In view of Indian political realities it was really anybody's guess. As the week began the various ideas floated were that, India might, by holding out, force a compromise and get changes to the treaty. It might agree to limit its opposition to the Test-ban to refusing to sign a completed treaty and agree to not use its veto. It might just as easily decide to exercise its veto and kill the treaty, forcing either new talks, or forcing the U.S. and the other members of the nuclear weapons club to try and end run the treaty around India directly to the floor of the United Nations and wage battle for it there. Should the latter happen the question is will global support stand firm for the Ramaker version of a Test-ban or will others with their own concerns decide to use the opportunity to force new negotiations and set the entire process back to the starting gate. The bottom line question in that case will be can the moratorium against testing hold during any extended debate, or extended negotiations, or will it provide an opening for the nuclear weapons states to conduct one more "LAST" round of tests?
On August 14 India ended the suspense when it formally vetoed the Ramaker text and prevented the Treaty from being sent to the full CD for a final vote. It was somewhat ironic that the action by India was to come on the 49 anniversity of India's independence. India's Prime Minister used that fact to inform his nation's people that India had stood firm in the face of extensive world pressure, and had excerted its independence.
With India's action the current Test-ban talks and treaty preperations are dead. Either additional talks will have to take place at the CD, or other nations such as the United States will have to try and force the draft Test-ban debate to the floor of the United Nations. Either way the future looks like one of extended debate, international name calling, and with it little chance the world will see a Test-ban anytime soon. Global efforts to obtain a Test-ban Treaty now appear to be facing their biggest crisis since the end of the 1958-1961 moratorium on above-ground testing.
Will the current moratorium on testing hold until a new round of talks can perhaps reach agreement on a new Treaty, or will the world see a new testing rush as the Big-5 take advantage of the opportunity failure to seccure a Test-ban provides? Already there are signs pointing in the latter direction. The same time India was vetoing the Test-ban the Republican Convention in San Diego was calling "ANY" Test-ban a threat to United States security. The next few weeks and months will clearly be a crisis for efforts to forever halt testing. The Cold War may have ended, but the Nuclear Arms Race perhaps has not!
Downwinders will be providing updates on this situation as they development as a part of Testing News Service. To keep informed please check back regularly.
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